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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

JAY P. MCCLOSKEY*
Let me start out by saying that in the District of Maine, where I have been
United States Attorney for seven years and an Assistant U.S. Attorney for
thirteen years, that we do, in fact, meet the standards of the Guidelines and
rarely deviate from the strictures of the Guidelines as found in this little brown
book. At least in the District of Maine, there are exceptions, but there are
relatively few.
Kate Stith had asked me to speak on the role of the prosecutor preGuidelines and post-Guidelines and I think I will start out by briefly
summarizing those differences. Prior to the Guidelines, under the old system,
prosecutors had discretion to charge the most appropriate offense, to negotiate
plea agreements, and to make sentence recommendations that reflected their
judgment of the serious and specific facts of the criminal conduct, taking into
account the goals of punishment, general and specific deterrence, protection of
the public, and rehabilitation of the defendant.
The judges in that system had the discretion to sentence anywhere within
the statutory range. Although as we approached 1987, an increasing number of
minimum mandatory sentences had started to erode the judges’ discretion on
sentencing.
Appeals of sentence were relatively uncommon. And prosecutors under
the old system spent very little time on sentencing issues, preparing for
sentencing, and certainly on sentencing appeals. That is the way it worked
from a prosecutor’s prospective under the old system.
Under the Guideline System, beginning in November of 1987, this all
changed. Prosecutors now spend a great deal of time on sentencing issues,
preparing for sentencing, and goodness knows on sentencing appeals. Now,
under the Sentencing Guidelines, if the prosecutors are doing it right, they have
a responsibility to assure that their charging and plea bargaining decisions do
not undermind the Sentencing Reform Act.

* Jay P. McCloskey is the United States Attorney for the District of Maine, a position he has held
since 1993. Since 1993, Mr. McCloskey has served as chair of the Attorney General’s Advisory
Committee on Sentencing Guidelines. Mr. McCloskey is a graduate of the University of Maine
and of its law school. He has worked closely at different times with several leading national
figures from Maine, including the late Senator Edmund Muskie, former U.S. Senator, George
Mitchell, and then U.S. Senator William Hathaway. For thirteen years prior to his appointment to
his current position by President Clinton, Mr. McCloskey served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in
Maine.
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Pursuant to the Justice Department Policy set forth in the United States
Attorney’s Manual, federal prosecutors should charge the most serious offense
that is consistent with the defendant’s conduct and is likely to result in a
sustainable conviction. They should seek a plea to the most readably provable
charge under that first prescription, and prosecutors are not free to recommend
or agree to a sentence that is outside the applicable guideline range unless it is
based on an appropriate departure from the Guidelines. Prosecutors are
supposed to stipulate only to facts that accurately reflect the defendant’s
conduct, and they should provide all reasonably relevant information to the
probation office, who is supposed to check the prosecutor in terms of what is
the appropriate guideline.
Department of Justice policy also provides that there must be supervisory
approval, either by the United States Attorney, which I do in my office for
negotiated pleas, or a Criminal Chief or Division Chief. Every single plea that
is negotiated in my office, I approve and sign off on. A decision to drop
readily provable charges must also be approved at the supervisory level,
obviously in larger offices it is not the United States Attorney, but it might be
the Criminal Chief or a Division Chief. But if you are going to drop, for
example, a 924C charge, it has to be approved at the supervisory level.
Contrary to the position of the Washington Post, which accused me of
dropping gun charges, we do not do that in the District of Maine.1
If you, as a prosecutor, are going to seek a departure outside Chapter 5,
you need supervisory approval. And if you are going to move for a substantial
assistance departure, there is a DOJ policy that says the individual assistant
cannot do that without supervisory approval.2
There are exceptions to these rules as far as DOJ policy goes. The United
States Attorney’s Manual provides that, for example, if there were a strain on
office resources and proceeding to trial would significantly reduce the number
of cases in your office, then you could make exceptions to these rules.
When I came in as U.S. Attorney in 1993, I had a conversation with the
Attorney General that ultimately resulted several months later in what is
known as the Reno Amendment, which also provides for DOJ policy that
allows a prosecutor to make exceptions to the general policy that I just set
forth. The Reno Amendment provides:
It should be emphasized that charging decisions and plea agreements should
reflect adherence to the sentencing guidelines. However, a faithful and honest
application of the sentencing guidelines is not incompatible with selecting
charges or entering into plea agreements on the basis of an individualized

1. See Mary Pat Flaherty & Roberto Suro, Reno Criticizes Manipulation of U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1996, at A4.
2. Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Holders of U.S. Attorneys’
Manual, Title 9 (Oct. 12, 1993), reprinted in 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 352 (1994).
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assessment of the extent to which particular charges fit the specific
circumstances of the case are consistent with the purposes of the federal
criminal code and maximize the impact of federal resources on crime.3

So, the Reno Amendment allows prosecutors, in certain cases, to make
exceptions to what the Guidelines might otherwise require. But the Reno
Amendment also provided that in order to do this, the prosecutor again had to
get supervisory approval and that the approval had to be documented and made
part of the record, so that, to assure consistency and accountability, charging
and plea agreement decisions must be made at the appropriate level of
responsibility and documented with an appropriate record of the factors
applied.4
The way that it is supposed to work is that in some instances, under the
Reno Amendment, the prosecutor could get an exception to following the
Guidelines – say, not charging the highest provable offense – and charge
somebody in such a way that the sentence ultimately arrived at is more
appropriate for that particular person’s role in the conspiracy or role with
respect to that particular conduct. This is, I think, what prosecutors were
generally concerned about. That is, prosecutors were concerned about the way
drug offenses brought very high levels of incarceration, which in certain
instances might not be justified.
So, generally speaking, prosecutors had unlimited discretion prior to the
Guidelines to charge as they saw fit, to plea bargain as they saw fit, and to
make sentencing recommendations as they saw fit.
Under the Guidelines, that role has been greatly restricted but, at least as I
read it, there are exceptions to those rules which allow you to fit the particular
circumstances of that conduct into a guideline that is more appropriate for that
defendant.

3. Id.
4. Id.

